Golf Hotel Whiskey

Golf Hotel Whiskey: for pilots and aviation enthusiasts

Safety

Poor lookouts equal a mid-air collision

General Aviation News will often print excerpts from US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident reports including one dated September 2009 about a mid-air collision involving a Piper Warrior and a  Cessna 152 in Coolidge, Arizona that led to one fatality and one serious injury.

According to the report, the two aircraft were on simulated instrument flights in visual flight conditions doing lessons where the pilot in the left-seat had to wear a vision-restricting instrument training hood while the pilot in the right seat acted as a safety/lookout pilot. Moreover, the flights were taking place in airspace that had high density student training.

The accident itself occurred when the Piper rolled out of a right turn while practicing a holding pattern at a non-controlled airport while the Cessna pilot practiced departing a non-controlled airport to reach cruising altitude. Moreover, neither of the aircraft were under radar traffic advisories or in contact with controlling FAA facility but the Piper’s pilots later indicated they were monitoring the correct practice frequencies while the Cessna’s surviving pilot could not recall if he had made any position calls (However, his radio was set to the correct frequency).

The collision caused the Cessna’s right wing to penetrate the lower left engine cowl of the Piper while the Piper’s left main landing gear wheel and tire slammed into the right side of the Cessna’s aft fuselage. The collision’s impact also tore off part of the Cessna’s right wing and tail – causing it to crash while the pilots of the Piper were able to do a power-off forced landing.

Although the weather was reported as clear skies with 10 miles visibility, none of the surviving pilots said they had seen other aircraft before the collision occurred. Hence, the probable cause of the accident was ruled the failure of both the safety/spotter pilots to look out for and avoid other aircraft within the busy training airspace. In other words and even in perfect flying conditions, always be on the lookout for other aircraft.

The Reno Air Races crash: Who is legally accountable?

Maxwell S. Kennerly, an attorney with Beasley Firm, LLC, a law firm that not only litigates aviation accidents but whose founder flew several World War II vintage planes (including P-51s), has written a very comprehensive and informative post that takes a look at the legal liability aspects of the recent tragedy at the National Championship Air Races in Reno.

To first put things in perspective: Air shows are a big business in the US. In fact, Maxwell pointed out that approximately 17 million people will visit the 400 or so US air shows every year – roughly the same attendance as the NFL receives.

Meanwhile, initial reports about the accident have focused on the trim tab of the Galloping Ghost as photos and videos of the accident unfolding appear to show that the aircraft was missing one of its left side trim tabs entirely. Moreover, the AP has reported that Galloping Ghost bore “little resemblance to its original self” as it was completely rebuilt for speed and had a full 10 feet taken off its wingspan in order to make the aircraft fly faster.

So where does liability fall? Maxwell writes that he will:

…often say that fatal maritime and aviation accidents rarely happen as the result of a single, unlikely event. Usually, they’re caused by a cascade of failure.

Maxwell then wrote extensively about three critical areas where liability or fault could eventually be found for the crash at the Reno Air Races:

  1. Pilot Error. Jimmy Leeward was 74 years old and naturally there has been some chatter that age was a contributing factor in the accident. However, Leeward did have a valid third class medical certification certification dating from March 2010. Nevertheless, there is always the chance that some kind of pilot error did contribute to the accident but in all likelihood, Leeward was unconscious during the final moments of the flight and when the aircraft hit the ground.  
  2. Defective Parts, Design Issues or Inadequate Maintenance. A broken trim tab was apparently a factor in the crash but Maxwell wrote that he would be surprised if someone of Leeward’s stature did not have his aircraft frequently inspected. However, he also added that upon an investigation, you “often never know what you find.” Moreover, there is also the possibility that Galloping Ghost had been modified to the point that a broken trim was inevitable – meaning the owner(s), designer(s) and builder(s) are to blame for what occurred.
  3. Flight Planning. Finally, Maxwell pointed out that the National Championship Air Races have already had their share of accidents and it was probably only a matter of time before an aircraft ended up hitting a spectator stand. Hence, the city of Reno, the organizers of the Reno Air Races and the owners of the airport could all be blamed for allowing Galloping Ghost to fly a route that was so close to spectators when there had already been accidents or near misses in the past. 

At the end of his post, Maxwell concluded that whatever the NTSB and legal outcome of the investigation is:

…this crash may spell the end of the National Championship Air Races, at least in their current form. Maybe that’s for the best; if they’re not run in a safe manner, they shouldn’t be run at all. Or maybe the solution is something as simple as ensuring planes conform to save designs, mandating the use of proper harnesses, and moving the race a little bit further from the crowd.

Hence and although its to early to draw any definite conclusions, we want to ask you our readers what you think. In other words, where might the legal liability fall regarding the Reno Air Races tragedy? Moreover, what, if anything short of banning air races, can be done to advert another such tragedy? 

An 84 year too old to fly pilot crashes

General Aviation News will often print excerpts from USA National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) accident reports, including a September 2009 report about a Cessna 150 incident that involved an 84 year old pilot in Rosedale, Michigan that should serve as a warning to other pilots.

According to accident report, the 84-year-old pilot did not hold a medical certificate and neither he nor the aircraft had flown for the three year period prior to the accident. When the pilot attempted to take-off, he noticed that the Cessna 150 did not appear to have enough power to clear the brush or trees at the end of the runway. Hence, he was forced to veer the Cessna into the brush on the right side of the aircraft – resulting in substantial damage to the aircraft but no injuries to the pilot.

The pilot’s wife later told investigators that he had suffered a fall three years before and that both his physical and mental capabilities were such that he should not have been attempting to fly an aircraft.

In other words and as with driving, every pilot will probably (eventually) need to stop flying at some point in time for physical or mental reasons. And while making the decision to stop flying will be a difficult one, it will be the safest and best decision an older pilot ever makes. 

Are pilots addicted to the autopilot?

Recently, Air Facts magazine has posted another great question to online readers concerning whether or not the autopilot is overused. Specifically, Air Facts asked readers:

Question: The loss of control of an Airbus A330 over the Atlantic has led to calls for more hands on (as opposed to autopilot) training for airline crews. This subject has recently gotten a lot of attention in the press. Much ado about nothing or a real problem?

Reader John Zimmerman commented that he believes its unrealistic to expect pilots to not use the autopilot as much as modern aircraft need the autopilot to fly. He then added that you should “just try to hand-fly an airplane at 35,000 ft” and that the issue not being discussed was the way in which the autopilot failed:

It seemed to pretty much throw up its hands and say “you got it!” You would think there might be a safer way to alert the autopilot monitors (pilots) that there was an airspeed problem. Or maybe a 5 second warning before disconnecting.

Regional jet pilot Craig Beaty then commented that while he is completely comfortable with hand flying, he would still be reluctant to fly a jet with a broken autopilot for more than 2 to 3 of the 4 to 6 flights he typically does daily because its demanding to hand fly a high performance jet with passengers.

Finally, commenter Timothy Ettridge wrote that given a choice between a 2500 hour Alaskan bush pilot and a 20,000 hour airline pilot, he thinks the bush pilot would more likely have the “better touch” on the controls. He then added the more provocative thought that:

Airline pilots seem to be becoming more like computer graphics artists like me; more a manager of elaborate systems than a skilled artisan. Put a pen or paintbrush in my hand, and I’m not better than a child. Stick an airline pilot in a mountain valley on a windy day, and would he become like a child at the controls?

Hence, we want to ask you our readers what you think: Are pilots becoming to dependent on the autopilot and autopilot flying or perhaps the problem is the way in which the autopilot itself is designed?

A fatal return to the air for an aircraft not flown for awhile

General Aviation News will often reprint accident reports from the US’s National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) including one from August 2009 about a fatal accident involving an RV-6 in Caldwell, Idaho. According to a family member of the pilot killed in the crash, the aircraft had not been flown for about a year and had sat on the ramp.

However and a week before the fatal accident, the pilot did fly the aircraft once around the traffic pattern. Moreover and on the day of the fatal accident, the pilot had:

….removed and sandblasted the spark plugs, checked the cylinders for compression, and removed and cleaned the air filter. Some sort of foreign matter was found in the filter.

According to a witness of the accident, the aircraft had flown by him at 100 to 200 feet above ground level while making some kind of a popping noise and then it:

…made a quick left turn to a left downwind leg, and as the airplane continued on the downwind, the nose pitched up, but the airplane did not appear to be climbing. As the airplane came abeam the numbers, it made a steep left turn, followed by the nose dropping before it dove into the ground and erupted in flames. The airplane was destroyed by fire.

And while no anomalies were found with the engine, cylinders and valve train, all of the aircraft’s spark plugs had excessive gaps while all but one failed a bench check when they were exposed to pressure greater than 80 PSI. Moreover, no aircraft nor engine logbooks were found during the accident investigation.

Nevertheless, the pilot’s failure to maintain enough airspeed leading to a stall/spin during a maneuver in the traffic pattern was ruled as the probable cause of the fatal accident. However, the fact that the aircraft had not been flown in awhile along with the pilot’s servicing of the aircraft on the day of the accident were the most likely causes of the accident.

Is traditional stall training a waste of time?

Air Facts magazine has recently posted an interesting question for readers regarding stall training that has already attracted nearly 60 comments. Specifically, Air Facts magazine asked:

Question: Most inadvertent stalls that result in serious accidents occur at an altitude too low for a recovery. Do you think this means that practicing stalls at altitude is a waste of time?

Student pilot Joseph Chambers responded by writing that he thinks stall training is worth it because it gets future pilots out of their comfort zone and lets them know whether they can calmly react when a flight goes outside of the normal flight parameters. He also added that you do not know how you will react the first time in a stall as it will be “quite a ride” if you were not “raised on airplanes.”

ConcernedPilot posted that if a student pilot is learning how to fly an aircraft but is never taught the full capabilities of an aircraft, he or she is being set up for failure because flying will never be an ideal situation every time. Moreover, ConcernedPilot noted that in more advanced flying situations such as bush flying, a pilot will often need to fly right at stall speed.

However, CFIChuck was one reader who disagreed with much of the prevailing wisdom that other commenters had posted. Specifically, he wrote that he thought that stall training is a hold-over from the World War II mindset and it isn’t worth practicing. CFIChuck pointed out that:

We don’t practice crash landing, after all–we simply learn not to do it. Same for stalls–there is no reason to ever stall, period, and practicing it is just checking the box. If you ever stall for real, it’s too late, you won’t recover.

He did add that its also important to learn what types of flying scenarios will make you more susceptible to a stall and how to avoid them but he feels it’s a bad investment to go up to 3,000 feet for “feeling the break.”

Hence, we want to ask you our readers what you think: Is stall training a waste of time? Moreover, are stalls something that every pilot needs to experience in the cockpit rather than just learn about in the classroom?